The Long Incredible Journey of Anis Amri: Inside The Berlin December Truck Attack.

 The corporate media globally reported on the December terrorist attack by Anis Amri in Berlin Germany as a Lone wolf Attack, extensive investigation and study of the evidence provided by the experts in counterterrorism has exposed a glaring departure from the official narrative in regards to the attack and terror cells in the EU. Here then is an in depth expose on Amri and his handlers in the EU and the sophisticated encrypted communications ability that they employed, their use of social media et al. It should be noted that Amri was quite savvy with social media since he established a literal online documentation of his various attacks. I will also cite information from IS’ latest online magazine Rumiyah showing that what Amri did was simply in obedience to the directives of the leadership in the Islamic State.  

Figure 1. Anis Amri in an Islamic State video giving baya (pledging allegiance), to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi emir of IS. Amri was eulogized in Islamic States Rumiyah online magazine issue# 5 in the following: “On the 19th of Rabi’ al-Awwal, one of the soldiers of the Khilafah – Abul-Bara at-Tunisi – carried out an operation in which he ran over several people in the heart of the German capital, Berlin, in response to the Islamic State’s call to target the citizens of nations involved in the Crusader coalition, which is killing Muslims. He targeted a Christmas market with his truck and succeeded in killing 12 people and in injuring 48 others. Following his successful operation in Germany, the gallant knight continued his march until he reached the outskirts of the city of Milano in Italy on the 23rd of Rabi’ al-Awwal and attacked an Italian police unit, leading to him attaining shahadah – we consider him so, and Allah is his judge – following an exchange of gunfire with the Crusaders.

The following is from CTC Sentinel issue 2 Volume 10 February 2017. The article quote was written by George Heil.

“The Berlin truck attack last December by Anis Amri, a Tunisian extremist suspected of communicating with Islamic State operatives in Libya, was not just the first fatal Islamic State-linked attack on German soil. It also exposed the danger posed by a radical network that Amri belonged to in northwestern Germany. The network, led by Iraqi preacher Abu Walaa, is believed to have recruited dozens to travel to join the Islamic State, communicated extensively with Islamic State operatives in Syria and Iraq, and encouraged attacks on German soil.  What investigators are learning about the network could have severe implications for European security”.

On December 19, 2016, Anis Amri a Tunisian hijacked a heavy truck after shooting its driver in the head, killing him.

Figure 2. Photo of the truck that Anis Amri used in the attack.

He then drove the truck into the Christmas market at Berlin’s Breitscheidplatz, killing 11 and wounding 55 people.  Days later the Islamic State’s Amaq agency released a video, showing Amri pledging allegiance to ISIS’ emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Amri was born in Tunisia in 1992, he according to his father was a troublemaker who stole and was thrown out of school: “My son Anis drank and stole, but he was radicalized in Europe”.  Amri stole a vehicle and was sentenced to be imprisoned in Tunisia in 2010, amid the chaos of the Tunisian revolution he fled to the EU. Amri entered the EU through the Italian island of Lampedusa he claimed to be 16 years old. He was placed in a refugee center for minors in Belpaso, Sicily. In October 2011, Amri and four other a fire. Amri was arrested and sentenced to four years in prison. The following is quoted from CTC Sentinel issue 2: “was during his incarceration in different Italian jails that Amri became radicalized. A report for the Italian Committee for Strategic Anti-Terrorism Analysis (CASA) stated that Amri was considered a “dangerous person” and a “leader of the Islamists in prison” and that he was “transferred due to severe security concerns.” Amri had threatened and attacked staff and reportedly threatened to decapitate a Christian inmate”.

I will prove from Islamic State material specifically their online magazine Rumiyah that Anis Amri and his handlers in the Islamic State, were directly following the orders of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. The following is quoted from Rumiyah issue #3 page ten captioned Just Terror Tactics: “Stationed behind enemy lines, the just terror mujahid has at his disposal a multitude of weapons and techniques that he may employ at any given time to inflict misery and destruction upon the enemies of Allah, demonstrating by his actions an unforgettable lesson for every hardheaded, obstinate kafir nation that wishes to engage in war on the Islamic State”.

In a section titled Vehicle Attacks, the writer stated: “Though being an essential part of modern life, very few actually comprehend the deadly and destructive capability of the motor vehicle and its capacity of reaping large numbers of casualties if used in a premeditated manner. This was superbly demonstrated in the attack launched by the brother Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel who, while traveling at the speed of approximately 90 kilometers per hour, plowed his 19-ton load-bearing truck into crowds celebrating Bastille Day in Nice, France, harvesting through his attack the slaughter of 86 Crusader citizens and injuring434 more. The method of such an attack is that a vehicle is plunged at a high speed into a large congregation of kuffar, smashing their bodies with the vehicle’s strong outer frame, while advancing forward – crushing their heads, torsos, and limbs under the vehicle’s wheels and chassis – and leaving behind a trail of carnage”.

What is described above is exactly what Amri did even practicing to drive the vehicle before he actually launched the attack. The fact that an Islamic State video, featuring Amri’s pledge of allegiance lends credence to the claim, that this was no Lone Wolf Attack, but a well-planned operation carried out with full approval and knowledge of senior Islamic State operatives in Germany and in Iraq, as the evidence will show.

The writer went on to state that: “Vehicles are like knives, as they are extremely easy to acquire. But unlike knives, which if found in one’s possession can be a cause for suspicion; vehicles arouse absolutely no doubts due to their widespread use throughout the world”.

The ideal vehicle as per the article would be: “a load-bearing truck, large in size, keeping in mind its controllability reasonably fast in speed or rate of acceleration (Note: Many European countries pre-restrict larger vehicles to specified speeds) Heavy in weight, assuring the destruction of whatever it hits double-wheeled, giving victims less of a chance to escape being crushed by the vehicle’s Possessing a slightly raised chassis (the under frame of the vehicle) and bumper, which allow for the mounting of sidewalks and breeching of barriers if needed If accessible, with a metal outer frame which are usually found in older cars, as the stronger outer frame allows for more damage to be caused when the vehicle is slammed into crowds, contrary to newer cars that are usually made of plastics and other weaker materials.

Figure 3: “An affordable weapon”. The photo was taken from Rumiyah issue #3, the quote to the left of this page is also from the same magazine in reference to the truck.

The magazine even list’s vehicles to avoid. It also names what is referred to as applicable targets (like the one below), listed are large outdoor conventions, pedestrian streets and high main streets. Further on the list are political rallies, outdoor markets, festivals and parades.

Figure 4: “An excellent target”, taken from Rumiyah issue#3 the quote to the left of page is taken from Rumiyah issue #3 referencing same.

Figure 5: Abu Walaa, senior Islamic State cleric and recruiter based in Germany. Walaa was one of the principal handlers of Anis Amri.

The guiding force behind Amri was this man the preacher Abu Walaa, before I delve further into who Abu Walaa is I must first finish tracking Anis Amri, for it is in understanding Amri’s European sojourn that the reader will gain keen insight the powerful explosive potential that IS and other organizations like it, wield in their recruitment efforts amongst refugees from Muslim countries in the West. The following is quoted from CTC Sentinel volume 10 February, 2017:

“On June 17, 2015, Italy was legally required to release Amri from

a deportation facility because Tunisian authorities had not responded to its request to send travel documents for him. After his release, Amri traveled to Switzerland, where he stayed for around two weeks before traveling to Germany.

25 In early July 2015, German police in the city of Freiburg, near the Swiss border, registered Amri for “unlawful entry” under the name Anis Amir and took his fingerprints and photo. In the first six months after his arrival in Germany, between July and December 2015, Amri registered at least five times as an asylum seeker under different identities. Altogether, he would use 14 identities in Germany”.

Amri attented classes at Madrasa Dortmund a Quran school. He had keys to the building and frequently slept there overnight. The school was run by Boban Simeonovic, a dual citizen of Serbia and Germany and Muslim convert. Simeonovic is also allegedly a top deputy of Abu Walaa. The following is from CTC Sentinel the issue already indicated in this post: “A police profile of Amri lists five contacts in “Madrasa Dortmund,” including Simeonovic. Also on the list is Hasan Celenk, a 51-year-old Turkish-Kurdish preacher who, alongside Simeonovic, was allegedly the other top deputy to Abu Walaa. Besides talking about committing an attack in Germany, Amri also aspired to join the Islamic State in Syria. According to investigative files, in December 2015 and January 2016, Simeonovic talked to others in the Abu Walaa network about organizing the logistics in order to send Amri to Syria.   

Five days before the attack on December 14, Amri came to Berlin. Both the phone he used and the prepaid SIM card inside it originated in Switzerland, as did his gun a .22 caliber German made Erma.

On the day of the attack, Amri repeatedly called a former roommate

(investigators have not said which one), but it remains unclear

if they actually spoke.  In the afternoon, Amri went to the Friedrich-Krause-Ufer, where heavy truckss are regularly parked. The area is also in the vicinity of Fussilet mosque and less than a mile from the Kieler Bridge, where Amri filmed his pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State. Having found a truck to hijack, Amri shot its Polish driver, Lukasz U, in the head and took control of the vehicle. As subsequent analysis of the truck’s GPS system has revealed, Amri practiced driving the vehicle before he left the truck and went over to the Fussilet mosque.

He then returned at around 7:30 PM and drove in the direction of Breitscheidplatz. On his way, he sent a voice message and a picture from within the truck via the Telegram messaging app to several individuals in Berlin and North Rhine-Westphalia. “My brother, everything is okay, inshallah. I am inside the vehicle now. Pray for me, my brother, pray for me.” At around 8:00 PM, Amri drove the truck into the Christmas market at Breitscheidplatz. The truck was stopped by an automatic braking system after it was driven approximately 70 meters through the market, preventing even greater loss of life.  Amri escaped on Amri escaped on foot and was caught by a CCTV camera at a nearby zoo station where he displays the Tawhid index finger, obviously aware of the cameras.  

The next trace of Amri surfaced on the afternoon of the next day, when someone—most likely Amri himself —logged into one of Amri’s Facebook accounts and deleted it. It is very likely that he went to Emmerich, close to the Dutch border, where he had previously lived and where a witness has claimed to have seen him.

Abu Walaa came to Germany in 2004 and obtained permanent residency in 2008 through marriage. He first appeared in the salafi scene in the state of Hesse, preaching at events held by the Frankfurt-based salafi missionary association Dawa FfM.  Another preacher who was active for Dawa Ffm, which was outlawed in 2013, was Abdellatif Rouali. After Abu Walaa’s arrest, Rouali replaced him as a teacher on al-manhaj.de, an online Qur’anic instruction website closely tied to the Hildesheim mosque and that promoted Abu Walaa’s social media channels.

According to Anil O., Abu Walaa told him he had personally been to the caliphate several times in the period after June 2014. 

                  

German authorities have so far ascertained that Abu Walaa left for Iraq on August 4, 2015—four days before Anil O. himself left Germany—and made a second trip to the country in early 2016. When prior to his arrest Abu Walaa was asked by German police for the reason for his trips, he claimed he wanted to visit relatives in Iraq.

Abu Walaa’s alleged two top deputies, Celenk and Simeonovic, worked closely together, sometimes even holding joint seminars. Simeonovic, described by Anil O. as an “extreme hardliner” and an outspoken supporter of the Islamic State, was the most hardline of the three—accusing Muslims of takfir (apostasy) “for not knowing certain things.”

Celenk allegedly convinced Anil O. that he would have no future in Germany after he was visited by a special police unit.  Celenk mainly preached at his travel agency in Duisburg, where every Monday and Friday his students had to sit on the floor and repeat Qur’anic verses.

Celenk stressed the obligation of participating in jihad and made his students watch Islamic State execution and decapitation videos. According to “VP01,” Simeonovic and Celenk regarded Germany as darul harb, a land of war, and repeatedly mentioned that attacks in Germany were justified and sought to encourage them. The informant claimed that both men were supportive when Amri mentioned several times he would seek to commit an attack in Germany.

The police informant further reported that one in Celenk’s community had talked about a plan to drive a truck filled with gasoline and loaded with a bomb into a crowd.

Anil O, also said there was talk within the Abu Walaa community about driving trucks into crowds.

The number of people the Abu Walaa network recruited for the Islamic State remains unknown. The official case file names 12 male individuals recruited by the network who successfully made the hijra and seven who attempted it.  Some of these 19 individuals traveled with their wives and children, raising the total.

  Others, who became foreign fighters for the Islamic State, like the twin brothers Kevin and Mark Knop who both died in suicide attacks, were not listed in the case files as being recruited by the network but were nevertheless radicalized by one of its key figures, Hasan Celenk.  

In the town of Wolfsburg, some 50 miles from Hildesheim, Yassin Oussaifi, a 32-year-old Tunisian citizen who went by the kunya Abu Obeida recruited 20 young men (mostly of Tunisian descent) for the Islamic State. 

Abu Walaa may have played a role in their radicalization. Not only did he hold a seminar in the town and in nearby Gifhorn but he had a “Dejavu – Jeans and more” store in Wolfsburg’s Porschestrasse 48, ah in close vicinity to where Oussaifi and his followers convened.  Oussaifi himself joined the caliphate on May 29, 2014, and worked there as a sharia judge.

 Abu Walaa also had a wide presence in the digital sphere.  He

was active on al-manhaj.de, and he had a German and an Arabic

Facebook profile and a YouTube channel. His supporters even created AbuWalaa apps for Android and iOS devices. His content also appeared on the social media channels of Islamic State members and supporters.aj Because he never showed his face in videos, Abu Walaa became known as “the preacher without a face.”

Abu Walaa was careful in other respects. He made sure there were no phones in the room when he talked about sensitive issues. Members of his network used the encryption app Telegram to communicate with each other and jihadis overseas.  In his online messages, the Iraqi preacher did not openly express support for the Islamic State but rather used coded language—for example, when he praised “our lions” fighting for Islam.

His words were well understood in the salafi scene as supportive of the Islamic State as Claudia Dantschke, who works in the field of prevention and deradicalization for the NGO Hayat has noted. During his “Islam seminars,” Abu Walaa used more explicit language. “Dawla is our country and the caliph is our caliph … we have to fight for our land and kill the kuffar that attack it,” he allegedly stated at one of the seminars.

Abu Walaa’s main base for his proselytization efforts was the DIK Hildesheim mosque, where he preached regularly on Fridays and had an office. It was from here that he gave money to those who wanted to travel to Syria. Up to 350 people would regularly show up at Friday prayers in Hildesheim, with intelligence officials estimating that roughly 10 percent of them were so radicalized that they were willing to use violence.

  In Hildesheim, Abu Walaa was supported by his aides Fifen Youssouf and Omeirat, who, according to the investigations, were responsible for providing recruits with phone numbers of Islamic State contact persons in Turkey. Fifen Youssouf was considered a close contact of Simeonovic, with the two having studied together at Dortmund University.

Later, Fifen Youssouf moved from Hildesheim to Dortmund where he led prayers and allegedly became the “right hand” of Abu Walaa. According to the informant “VP01,” Fifen Youssouf said he was involved in collecting donations for Islamic State fighters in Syria and Iraq and claimed the community at the DIK mosque in Hildesheim had sent almost €2 million ($2.1 million) to their “brothers” since the founding of the mosque in 2012. 

         

As the case of Anis Amri shows the extraordinary amount of EU wide mobility of “migrants”, having lived within the migrant community in Europe the mobility aspect is quite familiar, even amongst people from the so called Dutch Caribbean.  The fact that Amri was closely linked to a cleric namely Abu Wala is the rule within the Islamic State. Clerics are the apex in the Islamic State, even in Trinidad and Tobago. The preferred profile of an Islamic State recruiter is a cleric. Only when the true nature of IS, is understood in the West can the intelligence agencies and the counterterrorism agencies carry out their task’s effectively. What the Berlin attack has proven is the serious nature of the organizational hierarchy within IS, molded after the hierarchy in Iraq and Syria, namely a clerical hierarchy. It has also shown the ability of a relatively small group of people to wreak havoc in western cities, using a single individual to carry out an attack. Another aspect of the reality in Europe that is glaring is that time is not on the side of the western counterterrorism agencies, but on the side of the terrorist’s.